We analyze the implications of endogenizing information collection and reputational concerns for the performance of a sequential decision structure.
Introduction
In the last three decades, several studies have appeared on the relationship between the various ways decisions are made in organizations on the one hand and the performance of organizations on the other hand. A seminal paper is by Sah and Stiglitz (1986) , who studied situations in which individuals have to screen projects. 1 In their article, the way the screening process is organised is important for two reasons. First, individuals make errors of judgement. The implication of this aspect is that it is not always optimal to delegate the screening decision to one individual. Second, there are costs of acquiring and communicating information. The more individuals are involved in the screening process, the higher are these costs.
It is not very surprising that in a Sah and Stiglitz setting, sequential decision procedures are quite attractive. To understand why, consider an organizational unit responsible for the screening of project proposals the organization receives. One could think of, say, drafts of books submitted for publication with a publisher, music demos sent to a record company, or a request for a loan …led with a bank.
Suppose the unit is made up of two persons. The expected bene…ts are negative so that implementation of the project requires that both individuals accept the project.
Suppose a sequential decision procedure in which the project is …rst evaluated by one person. If this person accepts, then the project is forwarded to the second person who makes the …nal decision. If the …rst person rejects, then the project is discarded. 2 Clearly, compared to a situation in which two persons simultaneously evaluate projects, the sequential decision procedure saves on evaluation costs. If the …rst person rejects the projects, the second person does not have to evaluate the project anymore. Compared to a situation in which the decision is made by a single individual, the sequential decision procedure has the advantage that some errors of judgement of the …rst person can be corrected by the second person.
Without doubt, the literature building on Sah and Stiglitz has yielded many insights into the pros and cons of alternative decision procedures. However, a main 1 Related papers include Sah and Stiglitz (1988) , Young (1988) , Ladha (1992) , Koh (1992) , BenYashar and Nitzan (1997) , Gehrig et al. (2000) , and Visser (2000) . Other seminal contributions include Marschak and Radner (1972) and Keren and Levhari (1983) . 2 In case the expected bene…ts of the project are positive so that status quo requires that two individuals reject the project, then the decision is forwarded to the second individual if and only if the …rst individual rejects. drawback is that it ignores the e¤ect of the internal structure of an organization on its members'incentives to acquire information.
In this paper we examine the performance of a standard two-step sequential decision procedure in a situation in which the individuals participating do not automatically behave in line with the interest of the organization. Our model di¤ers from that of Sah and Stiglitz in two important aspects. First, we endogenise the process of opinion formation or information acquisition.
3 To see the relevance of this deviation, consider the examples of the selection processes given above. Evaluating the merits of a book or a demo, and the risks associated with a potential borrower takes time and e¤ort. Moreover, whether e¤ort is exerted is a matter of choice. Each individual has to decide whether or not to collect information. Given that in Sah and Stiglitz the cost of information collection plays an essential role, endogenising the acquisition of information seems to be a natural extension of their model.
The second deviation is that we assume that apart from caring about the project payo¤, individuals are concerned with their reputation as decision makers. Arguably, one of the key assets of a publisher, a record company, or a bank is its ability to separate the wheat from the cha¤. It is therefore likely that people who are successful at identifying good proposals are worth more to the organization and are therefore more likely to be kept and promoted. As a consequence, an employee evaluating the quality of a proposal is likely to care about his perceived screening ability. We assume that there are two types of employees, smart and dumb ones. Smart employees are more likely to make correct decisions than dumb employees. The reputation of an individual is de…ned as the (posterior) probability that he is smart.
We derive two results. First, if reputational concerns are su¢ ciently strong and the individuals'abilities do not di¤er too much, then the …rst individual in the decision process does not collect information and always delegates the decision about the project to the second individual. Evidently, the performance of a sequential decision procedure is then identical to the performance of a procedure that delegates the decision about the project immediately to agent 2. To understand our …rst result, suppose that the …rst individual in the decision process collected information and accepted the project. As we know from the herding literature, reputational concerns
give then an incentive to the second individual to accept the project too, irrespective of her information. As information is endogenous, agent 2 therefore decides not to exert e¤ort to acquire information. Agent 1 anticipates the behaviour of agent 2.
The behaviour of agent 2, however, is conditional on the behaviour of agent 1. By not collecting information, agent 1 eliminates agent 2's incentive to refrain from exerting e¤ort. At this point, the public good feature of information is important.
Concerning information collection, each agent wants to free-ride on the other agent.
Agent 1 can do so by directly forwarding the decision to agent 2.
Another way of putting our …rst result is that endogenising information in a model with reputational concerns changes the possible distortion in the decision process from herding to free-riding. Our second result is that endogenising information aggravates the distortion, in the sense that with endogenous information free-riding occurs for a wider range of parameters than herding with exogenous information.
The practical implication of our …ndings is that where a sequential decision structure would have been best from a project payo¤ perspective, in practice we may see that the decision is taken by a single person. The loa…ng makes it unattractive to keep two employees.
To illustrate the relevance of our paper, …rst consider the way a typical Dutch literary publisher evaluates a new manuscript submitted for publication. 4 First, the publisher checks whether or not the manuscript …ts in its collection. Next, the real screening starts. The book is given to an editor. Only if this editor has a positive view, another editor (or an external reader) is involved. If this agent is also positive, the author will be invited for a meeting.
Now consider the way a typical Dutch bank evaluates a request for a standard loan (up to euro 250,000). 5 In the …rst stage, a commercial agent helps the client to submit a proposal. Once the proposal has been completed, it is sent to a …nancial analyst who evaluates its merits. If the proposal is approved, it is checked whether the analyst has the authority to approve the proposal. If so, the loan can be provided.
The di¤erence between the publisher case and the bank case is clear. lisher case is a typical example of a sequential decision procedure as discussed at the beginning of the introduction. In the bank case, the screening of standard loans is done by one agent. After the screening, the procedure is checked (in particular, whether the analyst has the authority to approve the proposal). Our paper gives a possible explanantion for the di¤erence between the two screening procedures. This explanantion requires that relative to …nancial analysts, editors care more about their product, and less about their reputation.
Apart from the literature on the internal structure of organizations, our paper is related to the literature on herd behaviour. Our model is similar in spirit to one studied by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) . They consider a situation in which agents make decisions with a view to manipulating inferences regarding their ability.
Like us, they consider a situation in which agents make decisions sequentially. Our model di¤ers from Scharfstein and Stein in three respects. First, in our model, the agents make a decision about one public project instead of two private projects.
Second, information is endogenised. Third, agents do not only care about their reputation but are also concerned with project outcomes. 6 One of the main results of Scharfstein and Stein is that the second agent has an incentive to mimic the …rst agent, by ignoring private information. This incentive also plays an essential role in our model. With endogenous information and a public project, however, the incentive to mimic leads to free-riding rather than herding.
Our paper is also closely related to Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) who study the consequences of statistical and reputational herding for the optimal order in which agents speak. They show that reputational concerns may imply that it is better to let agents participate in the decision process who are not too smart. As we will show, this also holds true in our model. In their model, however, information is exogenous and agents are exclusively concerned with their reputation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the model. Section 3 analyses the model and presents the equilibria. Section 4 analyzes a model in which agents attach a direct cost to disagreeing with each other. Section 5 summarises our main results. Proofs can be found in the appendix.
6 Scharfstein and Stein (1990) brie ‡y discusses this extension.
The Model

Decision Procedure
Two agents i = 1; 2 have to make a decision about a project. This decision is made sequentially. Agent 1 is the …rst to look at the project. If he decides to reject the project, X 1 = 0, the status quo is maintained. If instead he decides to accept the project, X 1 = 1, it moves on to the second agent, whose verdict is …nal.
That is, project implementation requires fX 1 = 1; X 2 = 1g, whereas fX 1 = 0g and fX 1 = 1; X 2 = 0g imply that the status quo will be maintained.
There are two states of the world 2 f h; hg. Each state occurs with an ex ante probability 1 2
. If the project is implemented, the project yields p + utility to each agent, where p denotes the expected bene…t of the project. By normalisation, status quo does not deliver utility. Throughout, we assume that h < p < 0.
The implication of this assumption is that the correct decision about the project depends on the state of the world. Moreover, without further information about , each agent prefers rejection to implementation.
Before deciding on the project, an agent i may examine the pros and cons of the project. The e¤ort that comes with this is costly to the agent, C. Whether e¤ort is of any use depends on the type t i or quality of agent i who undertakes the research. A smart agent, t = sm, is more likely to bene…t from the outcomes than a dumb agent. In fact, we assume that a smart agent fully bene…ts from the research he undertakes: the signal s i = fb; gg he receives is fully informative (s i = g if and only if = h; s i = b if and only if = h). Any research undertaken by a dumb agent, t = du, on the other hand, is to no avail. That is, a dumb agent receives an uninformative signal: s i = g with probability 1 2
, independent of the true state of the world 7 . If no e¤ort is exerted, the agent bases his decision on his prior knowledge and his position in the decision structure. We assume that agents do not know whether they are smart or dumb. Agent i only knows that he is smart with probability i . This probability is common knowledge. 
Timing
At the beginning of the game, nature chooses the state of the world, and the types of agents. Next, agent 1 decides whether to exert e¤ort. Then in the absence or presence of a signal he must decide whether to reject the project, X 1 = 0, or to recommend implementation, X 1 = 1. We assume that an agent can show that he has not exerted e¤ort. The motivation of this assumption is that information collection takes time. By choosing X 1 = 1 instantaneously, agent 1 can signal that he has not exerted e¤ort. However, an agent cannot prove that he has exerted e¤ort.
Waiting does not "prove" that agent 1 has exerted e¤ort. If agent 1 has chosen implementation, the project moves on for evaluation by agent 2. Agent 2 decides whether to exert e¤ort or not, and whether the project should be implemented, X 2 = 1, or rejected, X 2 = 0. At the end of the game, the organization updates its beliefs about the probability that each agent is smart, based on the individual decisions made by the agents; fX 1 = 1g, fX 1 = 1; X 2 = 1g, and fX 1 = 1; X 2 = 0g.
We assume that the organization does not observe the true state of the world when the project is implemented. At the end of this paper, we will come back to this assumption.
Preferences
The agents are concerned both with the outcomes of the project-the expected project payo¤-and with their reputation. Agent i's reputation is de…ned as the posterior probability that i is smart, b i . The payo¤ to i, net of any cost of exerting e¤ort C, equals
In equation (1), denotes the weight an agent places on reputation relative to the outcomes of the project.
The Economic Environment
We make two sets of assumptions in order to guarantee an interesting economic environment. First, we assume that in case of decision making by a single agent, a situation we call delegation, this agent will exert e¤ort and follow his signal. This amounts to assuming that 8;9
Assumption 1 In case of single agent decision making ('delegation'), an agent implements the project only if the signal is positive, p + i h > 0 for both i = 1; 2.
Assumption 2 In case of single agent decision making, an agent exerts e¤ort,
Note that a bad signal leads to project rejection without further assumptions as
A similar set of assumptions is made to make a sequential decision structure interesting and viable if agents are only driven by the project's payo¤. That is, conditional on having exerted e¤ort, the agents should be willing to follow their respective signals. Assumption 1 ensures that two positive signals lead to implementation. What remains to be guaranteed is that in case of con ‡icting signals s 1 6 = s 2 the expected project payo¤ net of costs of e¤ort is negative or zero, Assumption 3 In case of two con ‡icting signals, the project payo¤ is negative or
Note that if the condition in Assumption 2 holds, so does the one in Assumption 1. We prefer to present these assumptions separately because they refer to di¤erent stages in the decision making process. 9 In the Appendix, part A.2, we show that the mathematical statements imply the desired behaviour.
Were this not the case, one would want to delegate the decision to agent i, as a good signal received by this agent would have such a large likelihood to be informative that the worst possible information the other agent can receive (a negative signal)
would not change the verdict on the project. With assumption 3, a 'statistical cascade' will not occur as it is not rational to ignore a second, bad signal 10 . We further assume that if agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, the increase in expected project payo¤ thanks to the addition of agent 2's e¤ort exceeds the costs of this additional e¤ort. Conditional on agent 1 having exerted e¤ort and following his signal, implementation by agent 2 without exerting e¤ort yields p + 1 h. If agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal his payo¤ becomes
Assumption 4 If agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, the increase in expected project payo¤ thanks to agent 2's e¤ort exceeds the costs of this e¤ort,
Similarly, without reputational concerns agent 1 would be willing to exert e¤ort and follow his signal if agent 2 already exerts e¤ort and follows her signal. This requires that Assumption 5 If agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, agent 1's e¤ort is e¢ cient,
The assumptions (3), (4) and (5) are necessary and su¢ cient to make a sequential decision structure viable and interesting.
11
Analysis
Ours is a dynamic model with incomplete information. An equilibrium speci…es for each agent i a decision rule that determines whether to exert e¤ort, and whether to accept the project -possibly conditional on a signal -such that expected utility is maximised, given the strategy of the other agent and the posterior beliefs held by 10 For an introduction to the cascading literature, see Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, and Welch (1998) and the references therein.
11 Note once again that if assumptions (4) and (5) hold so does assumption (3).
the market. For the market, it means that the posterior beliefs are formed according to Bayes'rule 12 .
Agent 2
We start by analysing the behaviour of agent 2 who has received a project from agent 1. Suppose agent 1 exerted e¤ort and followed his signal. In this section we analyse the best reply of agent 2 in this situation. Although we assume that agent 2 cannot observe with what likelihood agent 1 exerted e¤ort, in equilibrium this is known. In Section 3.2, we analyse under which conditions agent 1 exerts e¤ort and
show that if agent 1 exerts e¤ort, he will always follow his signal.
Posterior beliefs
Below we will argue that if agent 2 receives a positive signal, she has no incentive to reject the project. However, if agent 2 receives a negative signal, she may vote for implementation. Therefore, let be the probability with which agent 2 exerts e¤ort, let be the probability the project is accepted if she receives a signal that is negative, and assume the project is accepted if she receives a positive signal. Lemma 1 states the posterior beliefs concerning agent 2's type.
Lemma 1 Suppose agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. Suppose X 2 = 1 if s 2 = g. Let = Pr (2 exerts e¤ort) and = Pr (X 2 = 1js 2 = b). Then the posterior beliefs about agent 2's type equal
reputation by mimicking agent 1's decision as this suggests she received a positive signal.
Project Choice
We continue to assume that agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. Assume agent 2 has exerted e¤ort and has therefore received a signal. The question becomes what agent 2 decides on the project if s 2 = g and s 2 = b. The main result of the herding literature applies. Given that both agents exert e¤ort and thus possess private information, su¢ ciently strong reputational concerns induce agent 2 to ignore her private signal and to mimic agent 1. In case of a positive signal, she prefers project implementation to rejection as this leads both to a positive project payo¤ and to a better reputation. In case of a negative signal, rejection gives her
whereas implementation yields
Therefore, if agent 2 received signal s 2 = b, whether she prefers rejection to implementation depends on the sign of
The …rst term in brackets is negative by Assumption 3, p + she sometimes ignores her negative signal and accepts the project, 2 [0; 1].
13
13 Of course, the posterior belief b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) depends on and is consistent with each type of behaviour of agent 2 (i.e., with the value of ), see the proof of Lemma 2 Lemma 2 Suppose agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. Suppose agent 2 exerts e¤ort. Then, for < , agent 2 follows her signal, = 0; for 2 [ ; ], she sometimes ignores a bad signal ('probabilistic herding'), 2 [0; 1]; and for > , she herds with probability one, = 1.
In particular, if agent 2 cares exclusively about her reputation, which amounts to ! 1 in our model, she always herds.
E¤ort
Now that we have derived the behaviour of agent 2 conditional on e¤ort having been exerted, we turn to the conditions which rule her decision to exert e¤ort or not. If agent 2 does not exert e¤ort, = 0, it is optimal to implement the project.
Recall that we have assumed that decision making by one agent yields more than always maintaining the status quo, see assumption 1. Essentially, not exerting e¤ort amounts to delegating the decision to agent 1. Agent 2's payo¤ then equals:
If agent 2 exerts e¤ort, she anticipates how she will react to signals. As shown in lemma 2, if agent 2 cares considerably about her reputation, > , she will herd if she exerts e¤ort -a project that reaches her desk is implemented irrespective of her signal. Clearly, in this case, agent 2 does not exert e¤ort and always implements a project that lands on her desk -nobody is willing to pay for information that will surely not be used.
If agent 2 cares to a moderate degree about her reputation, 2 [ ; ], exerting e¤ort and sometimes implementing a project in case of s 2 = b yields a payo¤ equal
In deriving (8), we used that if agent 2 mixes in case of a bad signal s 2 = b, a signal she receives with probability 1 2
(1 1 2 ), she is indi¤erent between implementation and rejection. This implies that before observing the signal s 2 2 fg; bg, agent 2 knows that implementation yields at least as much as rejection. Under such circumstances, it does not make sense to exert costly e¤ort to obtain a signal. This is also borne out by a comparison of equations (8) and (7). For 2 [ ; ], then, agent 2 prefers not exerting e¤ort to exerting e¤ort. Lemma 3 sums up the discussion so far.
Lemma 3 If information is costly, neither herding nor probabilistic herding occurs in equilibrium. Instead of (probabilistic) herding taking place, information is not acquired.
The situation that remains to be studied is the one in which agent 2 cares relatively little about her reputation, < . In that case, with the costs of e¤ort sunk, information is used e¢ ciently. In particular, a signal s 2 = b leads to project rejection as the gain in reputation stemming from project acceptance is more than o¤set by the reduction in project payo¤. As without information agent 2 would accept the project, exerting e¤ort is only useful if a negative signal is obtained and leads to a rejection of the project (a positive signal leads to project acceptance).
For less than but very close to , agent 2 would have followed her negative signal if she were to have it for free. However, for any positive costs, she is unwilling to exert the e¤ort and incur the costs. In other words, for any cost level C, there is a value C < such that for > C , agent 2 is unwilling to exert e¤ort, even though she would use the information e¢ ciently once it were there. The bene…t of exerting e¤ort and then following one's signal as compared with not exerting e¤ort and implementing the project is the increase in project payo¤. Exerting e¤ort is however costly per se, and hurts one's reputation in the event of a negative signal. Only if agent 2 cares su¢ ciently little about her reputation, < C , where C < C < , will agent 2 follow her signal and exert e¤ort. Lemma 4 states the exact conditions.
14 Lemma 4 Suppose agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. Furthermore suppose that the posterior beliefs are given by (2) and (3). Then, the unique best reply of agent 2 is as follows. For < C , agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows her signal, = 1, = 0. For 2 C ; C , agent 2 exerts e¤ort with probability , where is the root of (A.11), and follows her signal if she has one, = 0. For > C , agent 2 exerts no e¤ort, and chooses X 2 = 1, = 0, = 1. Furthermore,
By Assumption 2, if agent 1 does not exert e¤ort-if he delegates the decision on the project to agent 2-agent 2 is better o¤ exerting e¤ort and following her signal than following any other strategy.
Agent 1 and Equilibrium Selection
Project Choice
We now analyse the behaviour of agent 1. We …rst assume he has exerted e¤ort and received a signal. Suppose he has received a negative signal, s 1 = b. The best he can do is to maintain the status quo. First, on the basis of Assumption 3, even if agent 2 were to receive a positive signal, expected project payo¤ would be negative. Second, passing on the project to agent 2 would not improve his expected reputation. Now suppose he has received a positive signal, s 1 = g. Rejection would lead to a project payo¤ equal to zero. Acceptance either leads to agent 2 exerting e¤ort and following her signal (for < C ), or to agent 2 being indi¤erent between exerting e¤ort or not (for 2 C ; C ), or to agent 2 preferring not to exert e¤ort and implement the project without further ado ( > C ). In any case, expected project payo¤s are larger than zero, while the expected reputation of agent 1 is left una¤ected. Hence, acceptance dominates rejection in case of a good signal.
Lemma 5 In any equilibrium in which agent 1 exerts e¤ort, he follows his signal.
E¤ort
Now consider the e¤ort decision. By assumption, agent 1 can show that he has not exerted e¤ort. If agent 1 does not exert e¤ort, he prefers delegating the decision about the project to rejecting it out of hand. His payo¤ equals
If agent 1 does exert e¤ort, agent 2's reaction is described in Lemma 4. Three cases have to be distinguished. First, if agent 2 cares little about her reputation, < C , she exerts e¤ort and follows her signal if agent 1 does. In subsection 2.4, we have characterized the economic environment in such a way that agent 1 is willing to exert e¤ort if agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows her signal, see assumption 5.
Lemma 6 For < C , agent 1 exerts e¤ort (and follows his signal).
For the two remaining cases, 2 C ; C and > C , it is important to observe that if agent 1 is the only agent to exert e¤ort (because agent 2 does not exert e¤ort and implements a project with probability one if agent 1 exerts e¤ort), then the payo¤ for agent 1 equals
A comparison of expressions (9) and (10) shows that if
agent 1 (weakly) prefers to decide about the project himself rather than letting the decision on the project depend solely on agent 2. As a consequence, if this inequality holds, agent 1 prefers exerting e¤ort to delegating the decision to agent 2 both if the latter agent cares to a moderate degree about her reputation, 2 C ; C , and if she cares considerably about her reputation, > C .
Consider …rst the case that 2 C ; C . Then from Lemma 4 we know that with probability agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows her signal if agent 1 exerts e¤ort. We know by assumption 5 that agent 1 then bene…ts from exerting e¤ort.
With probability 1 agent 2 does not exert e¤ort but implements the project.
If equation (11) holds, agent 1 still prefers to exert e¤ort rather than delegating the decision to agent 2. That is, whether agent 2 exerts e¤ort or not, agent 1 prefers exerting e¤ort to not exerting e¤ort.
Similarly, for > C , agent 2 does not exert e¤ort but implements the project if agent 1 exerts e¤ort. Once again, if equation (11) holds, agent 1 prefers to exert e¤ort rather than delegating the decision to agent 2. ( 1 2 ) h C, agent 1 exerts e¤ort independent of the behaviour of agent 2. In particular, the degree to which agent 2 cares about his reputation is unimportant.
If instead
agent 1 prefers delegating the decision on the project to agent 2 compared to being the only one to decide on the project. For > C , then, agent 1 refrains from exerting e¤ort and delegates the decision to agent 2. If equality (12) 
such that for > , agent 1 exerts e¤ort, whereas for < he does not exert e¤ort but delegates the decision making to agent 2. He is indi¤erent for = and we assume he does not exert e¤ort. As agent 1 cannot in ‡uence the expected value of his ex post reputation, is independent of . ( 1 2 ) h < C. If > C , then agent 1 exerts no e¤ort. If 2 C ; C , then agent 1 exerts e¤ort if and only if > , where solves (13) and is the root of (A.11).
We are now ready to state the equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 1
The equilibrium strategies for agents 1 and 2 are as follows. ( 1 2 ) h C, agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, whereas agent 2 exerts e¤ort with probability and follows her signal if she has one, = 0. Posterior beliefs equal b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) = 2 (1 1 ) 2 (1 1 2 ) 2 and b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0) =
( 1 2 ) h < C and > , where is the root of (A.11), agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, and agent 2 exerts e¤ort with probability , and follows her signal if she has one, = 0. Posterior beliefs equal b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) = 2 (1 1 ) 2 (1 1 2 ) 2 and b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0) =
( 1 2 ) h < C, and , where is the root of (A.11), ( 1 2 ) h C, agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, whereas agent 2 implements the project without exerting e¤ort, = 0, = 1.
The posterior beliefs in case of implementation equals b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) = 2 , whereas a plausible out-of-equilibrium belief is b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0) = ( 1 2 ) h < C, agent 1 delegates decision making to agent 2 who exerts e¤ort, = 1, and follows her signal, = 0. Posterior beliefs
Let us interpret these results within the context of our record company example. In case 1, in which the second expert cares relatively little about her reputation, both experts spend time listening to the demo and giving a sound advice. In the second case, the …rst expert listens very carefully, whereas the second expert sometimes refrains from listening at all and simply goes along with the …rst expert's judgment without further ado. The …rst expert's analysis is su¢ ciently more likely to be insightful than the second's to merit the e¤ort. There is therefore no reason to delegate the decision to the second expert. In the third case, the same type of behaviour results but for a di¤erent reason. Now, besides the second expert's moderately strong interest in her reputation, the experts' abilities are very similar. Both constitute reasons to delegate the decision to the second expert. What keeps the …rst expert from delegating the decision to the second is the fact that although the latter expert sometimes mimics the …rst expert's judgment she does so with a relatively small likelihood. In the fourth case, this likelihood is substantial. As a result, the expert who is supposed to evaluate the demo …rst immediately forwards it to the second expert. In both the …fth and the sixth case, the second expert cares considerably about her reputation. Joint decision making is impossible. The …rst expert then has to decide who should decide on the demo, himself or the second expert? This depends on their relative abilities and the cost of giving a sound advice.
Recall that the economic environment we have assumed in Subsection 2.4 makes sequential decision making optimal. If agent 2 cares little about her reputation, < C , both agents exert e¤ort and follow their private signals. In this case, the total value generated equals the maximally attainable,
The cost component 3 2 C points to one of the advantages of a sequential structure, the fact that agent 2 exerts e¤ort only half of the time. If agent 1 delegates decision making to agent 2, or if agent 2 does not exert e¤ort with probability one, the project payo¤ decreases, and the result is ine¢ cient from a project point of view.
Proposition 1 shows that as soon as > C there is a positive probability that the decision on the project is distorted. An important implication of Lemma 4 is that with endogenous information the project decision is distorted for a wider range of parameters than with exogenous information. Therefore, endogenizing information makes a sequential decision procedure more vulnerable for the adverse consequences of reputational concerns.
Direct Costs Attached to Disagreeing
In this section, we model the e¤ects of career concerns in a di¤erent way 15 . Rather than having the organization's updated belief about the agent's level of competence entering the utility function, we now assume that an agent i su¤ers a loss K i in case 15 We are grateful to an associate editor for suggesting this approach.
his recommendation does not agree with that of the other agent. An agent's utility function, net of costs of e¤ort becomes:
We …rst characterize the second agent's best reply. De…ne
Lemma 9 (i) Suppose agent 1 has exerted e¤ort and followed his signal. Then agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal if and only if K 2 < K 2 . If this condition fails to hold, agent 2 does not exert e¤ort, but simply accepts the project. (ii) If instead agent 1 has not exerted e¤ort, agent 2 does and follows his signal
To grasp the idea behind Lemma 9, suppose agent 1 has exerted e¤ort. If agent 2 exerts e¤ort, this implies that he is willing to act upon his information. In particular, he is willing to incur a cost K 2 by rejecting the project in case of a negative assessment. Hence, for agent 2 to exert e¤ort he should not care too much about showing an opinion di¤erent from agent 1, or K 2 < K 2 . Of course, if agent 1 does not exert e¤ort, it follows from assumption 2 that agent 2 will. Now we turn to the equilibria of this model. De…ne
Proposition 2 Suppose utility functions are de…ned as in (14). (i) If K 2 < K 2 and ( 1 2 ) h C, then agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal; agent 2 chooses X 2 = 1 without analyzing the project. (iv) If K 2 K 2 and 1 2
( 1 2 ) h < C, 1 forwards the project to 2 without analysing it; agent 2 then exerts e¤ort and follows his signal.
There is an important di¤erence between this model and the one discussed in the previous sections. In the previous model, the degree to which agent 1 cares about his reputation does not in ‡uence his decisions. As in equilibrium he cannot in ‡uence his expected reputation, he bases his decisions on project payo¤ comparisons only.
It can therefore not happen that agent 2 is willing to exert e¤ort and follow his signal, but that agent 1 refrains from exerting e¤ort. In the present model, however, this is exactly what happens in situation (ii). The fact that agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, K 2 < K 2 , and therefore rejects the project in case of a bad signal, withholds agent 1 from exerting e¤ort if he su¢ ciently dislikes disagreeing with agent 2, K 1 K 1 . The other three parts of the proposition are in line with what we found in the previous sections. Parts (i), (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2 are similar to parts 1, 5 and 6 of Proposition 1, respectively.
Discussion
We have analysed the implications of endogenising information collection and reputational concerns for the performance of a sequential decision structure. In our model, two agents decide in a sequence whether or not to implement a public project.
Each agent is concerned with the outcomes of the project and wants to be reputed as being smart. From the herding literature we know that in a sequential decision structure, reputational concerns may lead to herding. The reason for herding is that agent 2 hurts her reputation by disagreeing with agent 1. Since herding implies that private information is ignored, herding is ine¢ cient from a social point of view.
We show that endogenising information a¤ects the nature of the herding result in two ways. First, given that agent 1 collects information and acts on it, agent 2 does not collect information if she anticipates that she will ignore it when making a decision about the project. Not exerting e¤ort and following agent 1's decision dominates exerting e¤ort and following agent 1's decision.
The second way the herding result is a¤ected is that with endogenous information agent 1 often chooses not to collect information, thereby delegating the decision about the project to agent 2. The reason for this result is a free-rider problem. If agent 2 cares considerably about her reputation, the choice agent 1 faces is between exerting e¤ort himself or delegating the decision to agent 2. Joint decision making is unattainable. Unless agent 1 is much smarter than agent 2, agent 1 prefers a situation in which agent 2 collects information and makes the decision about the project to a situation in which he does the dirty work himself. This second e¤ect of endogenising information is important for the answer to the question who e¤ectively makes the decision about the project. With exogenous information and herding, it is the …rst agent in the sequence who e¤ectively makes the decision about the project.
With endogenous information, it is more likely that the second agent makes the decision.
The herding literature shows that reputational concerns may lead to a distortion in the decision process. An important result of our analysis is that with endogenous information an ine¢ cient outcome is more likely to occur. The reason is that even if agent 2 would not herd if she had collected information, reputational concerns increase the cost of acquiring information. The increase in cost stems from the fact that if agent 2 makes a decision in accordance with her information, she may hurt her reputation. Not collecting information and agreeing with agent 1 is always optimal from a reputation point of view.
A direct implication of our results is that in organizations the best man for the job is not always the individual who is most likely to be smart. To prevent agent 1 from delegating the decision about the project to agent 2, an organization may appoint a candidate who is smart with a lower probability than another candidate.
The reason is simple. The higher is the probability that the …rst agent is smart, the stronger is the incentive for the second agent to herd. By hiring an individual who has a relatively low probability of being smart, an organization may prevent the second person from herding. Then, agent 1 has weaker incentives to delegate the decision to the second agent.
In the introduction, we have already mentioned that potentially there are advantages of a sequential decision procedure. We have shown that endogenizing information collection makes sequential decision procedures more vulnerable to adverse consequences of reputational concerns. One interpretation of this result is that in situations in which reputational concerns are important, decisions will not be made by means of a sequential decision procedure. One alternative is delegating the decision to a single agent. When a single agent does not know her type, reputational concerns will not a¤ect her decision on the project (Suurmond, Swank and Visser, 2004) . Another alternative is a decision procedure according to which two agents make independent recommendations, so that herding cannot occur.
In this paper, we have assumed that the actual quality of the project will not 
Appendix
In this section, we …rst provide some useful mathematical derivations (subsection A.1), we then show that the conditions formulated in the assumptions create the desired environment (A.2), and …nally prove the lemmas and the main proposition (A.3). To save space, we write "g i "instead of "s i = g", and "b i "instead of "s i = b".
Also, instead of writing " = h"we write "h".
A.1 Useful expressions
It is useful to start with the following (un)conditional probabilities and expected
Hence,
In case of two signals,
A
.2 The Assumptions
We now show that the conditions formulated in the assumptions create the desired (p + 2 h). If agent 1 participates, the expected payo¤ for him amounts to
( 1 + 2 ) h C. Agent 1 exerts e¤ort if Assumption 5 holds.
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Recall that we assume that the strategy of agent 1 is to exert e¤ort and follow his signal. The imputed strategy of agent 2 is to exert e¤ort with probability , to implement if s 2 = g, to implement with probability if s 2 = b, and to implement if no e¤ort is exerted. We will show that with this strategy
. It is then directly clear that if agent 2 does not exert e¤ort, she prefers project implementation to maintaining the status quo. Project implementation yields both a higher reputation and a positive project payo¤ by assumption 2.
Of course, b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0) = Pr (t 2 = smjX 1 = 1; X 2 = 0). Given the imputed strategy, X 1 = 1 implies s 1 = g, whereas X 2 = 0 implies that agent 2 has exerted e¤ort and received a signal s 2 = b. Thus, Pr (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0jt 2 = sm) = 1 2
, because if 2 is smart the only way for agents 1 and 2 to have received opposing signals is for agent 1 to be dumb. Similarly, Pr (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0jt 2 = du) = 1 2 1 1 2
, as the signal of a dumb agent is uncorrelated with that of the …rst agent. Using Bayes rule we derive b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0) = 1 1 1 1 2 2 , which is equation (2). To calculate b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) recall that with the imputed strategy agent 2 implements a project either because she exerted e¤ort and received a signal s 2 = g; because she exerted e¤ort and she received a signal s 2 = b and implemented with probability ; or because she did not exert e¤ort. Moreover, agent 1, who passed on the project to agent 2 must have received a signal s 1 = g. Thus,
From this it immediately follows that b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) equals the expression in
Proof of Lemma 2: If agent 2 has received a negative signal, whether she prefers to reject or to implement the project is determined by the sign of expression (6).
Three cases are possible as far as consistency of agent 2's actions an posterior beliefs are concerned. In case (i), the expression in (6) is negative for = 0 substituted in b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0). Thus, in this case agent 2 always rejects the project if s 2 = b. Notice that (6) to be negative for = 0 requires that < , where denotes the value for which (6) equals zero for = 0. In case (ii), the expression in (6) is positive for = 1 substituted in b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0). Agent 2 always accepts the project if s 2 = b ( = 1). Rather than using her private information, she herds. Case (ii) requires that agent 2 cares su¢ ciently about her reputation, or > where is the value of such that the expression in (6) equals zero for = 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
See the text preceding the statement of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4:
This lemma assumes that agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. We …rst show formally that C < . Recall that is such that expression This also implies that C < . Let C be the value of for which (A.11) equals zero after substituting = 1 and = 0 into b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 1) b 2 (X 1 = 1; X 2 = 0). If < C , agent 2 always exerts e¤ort and will always follow her signal. Finally, in the third case, we have that C C , and agent 2 exerts e¤ort with probability 2 [0; 1], where is the root of (A.11) with = 1: agent 2 will always follow her signal (if she has one), since C < . Q.E.D. ( 1 2 ) h < C. Then one can …nd values C ; C as long as Assumption 4 holds (this assumption implies that the top line of (A.11) is positive, while the bottom line is negative for all parameter values). Therefore suppose 1 2
Proof of Lemma
( 1 2 ) h < C and 2 C ; C . Note that the value of 2 (0; 1) is independent of , see (13). 
